Tuesday, October 2, 2018

Russia TV Applauds Kannady, As He Ebarrasses USA


 Former Marine Teams up with Russian Propaganda TV Show to Accuse American Military
of Misconduct and Torturing Terrorist Prisoners
Worked with the ACLU to Release Terrorists 
An Obama Marine if there Ever Was One

Back on February 25th of this year we published the story of House Leadership's attack on the Sooner Tea Party led by Rep. Chris Kannady, an attack upon the 149 individual Facebook pages that had been set up covering each House and Senate district in the state. Kannady bragged to a South side OKC political activist who in turned warned the Sooner Tea Party of the threat of an unspecific impending attack.

Then shortly after Christmas the 149 pages were reported one by one to Facebook and taken down by their automatic bots used when someone claims they are offensive or not following the rules.  Some appeals were successful and the pages republished by Facebook but the majority of the pages were permanently unpublished with no further appeal possible.

What we didn't know was why House Leadership was so afraid of the Facebook pages that consisted of the 2017 Oklahoma RINO Index vote score for that particular public official and a series of posts explaining each bad vote and why the bill was against Oklahoma values and the GOP Party Platform. The posts weren't mean, they were unusually mild for one of our publications so we were left wondering what had set House Leadership off.


Then on Monday we learned the reason. Some of the pages had attracted admins, either activists or people in the district that liked what was being done and volunteered to maintain one or more pages. We found out that on of the admins had posted a video on Kannady's district Facebook page, one where Rep. Christopher Kannaday had an interview on Russian TV and that he was terrified that his voters would learn about the video.

RT used to be called Russia Today and now goes by its initials. The company is known as a Russian propaganda tool, well known and well funded.

The Russian TV show episode is on Youtube, and under the screen is the disclaimer:  "RT is funded in whole or in part by the Russian government ", leaving no doubt that Kannady was cooperating with the Russian government propaganda efforts to slander the American military.

The video opens with the news anchor, obviously Russian accent, introducing the scandal and then going to a reporter and Kannady in the Russian Times Washington D.C. Studio. The reporter interviews Kannady while Kannady wears a full Marine uniform.
Among the complaints made by Kannady is that the "government" cut their funding so they could only send one lawyer back to facilitate the arrival of Mohammed Jawad who Kannady had represented at Gitmo. Kannady sounded like the bleeding heart liberal that he is, complaining about Jawad being sent back to a country at war, that Jawad was suicidal, and Kannady vouched for Jawad, saying he had facts in his case that set him apart from the other detainees.

When asked why the former terror suspect was suing the U.S., Kannady mentioned monetary damages, perhaps getting a college education so he could be successful in life, and in short made it look like the U.S. military had arrested a mere child with no evidence. Much is made of Jawad's age, quoted as being 12 years old but relatives in other interviews put his age at 17 to 19 years old at the time of his capture and arrest. A bone scan done by military doctors determined Jawad was in his very late teens.

Jawad was arrested and accused of throwing a grenade into a vehicle carrying U.S. soldiers. Below is a description of what he was accused of doing:

"On December 17, 2002, two American Special Forces soldiers, Michael Lyons and Christopher Martin, along with their Afghan interpreter, drive an unmarked, soft-top jeep into a Kabul bazaar. They visit with a couple of vendors whom the team is cultivating as informants. They make a final stop, at a shop selling clocks. Lyons enters, asks the owner, "How is everything?" The shop keeper responds in broken English, "Everything's fine. How are you?"

"No," says Lyons, "how's everything...for me?"

The shopkeeper goes to the front of the store, scans the street, returns.  "Everything's fine," he says. "For you."

Lyons wants twenty-five wall clocks. A long conversation ensues, less haggling than an exercise in trust-building, and then he "tips out," overpaying an encouraging amount of money. Meanwhile, standing guard on the street, Martin has had a chilling premonition, a feeling that he's being watched through the scope of a rifle. When Lyons exits the shop with the interpreter, they quickly load the clocks, and all three hop in the jeep. The marketplace swarms with hundreds, thousands, of people just released from afternoon prayer at the mosque; traffic is bumper-to-bumper. Smoke from the outdoor barbecues wafts thickly with the scent of kebab meat. The jeep nudges forward, unable to merge into the swirl around a traffic circle.

And then a sickening thing occurs: The windshield suddenly shatters, leaving a spiderweb of cracked glass. "What the hell was that?" blurts Lyons in the driver's seat. They've been shot at from the front, he thinks, but there's no sign of attack on the street.
Then there's a hollow thud, like an empty bottle rolling on the floor. Martin, riding shotgun, glances over his shoulder at the interpreter, who's scanning the floor of the jeep. Martin looks down, frantically searching back to front, and as he lifts his eyes, a blinding flash of orange engulfs everything.

And then a deafening explosion.

In the next instant, Lyons lies slumped over the wheel, unresponsive, blood gushing from a tear in his femoral artery. His legs are mangled; his left foot is missing a toe.  Meanwhile, Martin, who's still in the passenger seat, looks down at his hands to find them covered in blood. But whose? The interpreter, badly wounded himself, flags a nearby taxi, piles the two U.S. soldiers in the back with their feet hanging out the open door, and sends the driver off with directions to get to a German field hospital.  The taxi wedges through the crowd, hitting people with the open door as it goes, the bloody legs dangling.

Back at the bazaar, various men are apprehended, but soon the only one left is the main suspect, who is described as"very young and clever" and who was allegedly caught in the act, arm cocked with a second grenade near the smoldering jeep. Unlike a suicide bomber or martyr, the subject is alive, talking, a tangible terrorist potentially packing vital information. Within hours, he supplies a  written confession that reads:

I came to Kabul alone from the province of Khost... No one had assigned me this task. I did this myself... I have a grudge against the Brits and the foreigners. They should not be in our country...
I executed this operation in Pul-e Khishti while they were riding in their Jeep. When they were on the street, I didn't attack them because innocent people were going to be killed. Once they climbed into their vehicle, I threw the hand grenade at them. I am sorry that some Afghans got wounded. I am happy that the foreigners got killed. "

Jawad was caught running away from the scene with two grenades in his pockets, running for a lake after a shopkeeper had told him to dispose of the grenades in the lake. Kannady's sob story is that his is just a poor kid that was in the wrong place and didn't recognize what a grenade looked like. In fact children in Afghanistan are recruited as young as six years old and take religious studies as well as learning to use weapons and plant IEDs.

This isn't the only terrorist that Rep. Christopher L Kannady helped escape justice.  Noor Uthman Muhammed was another terrorist suspect that Kannaday managed to represent so well that the terror suspect is going to get early release. Kannady claimed that Noor was a sliver of the terror organization but Noor admitted to training other terrorists to use weapons and to filling in as the camp commander on occasions.


What Iraq and Afghanistan veterans will tell you is that even the kids are dangerous, more so than the adults because the soldiers let their guards down. The bottom line is that Kannady chose to defend accused terrorists instead of protecting his fellow American soldiers.

And Kannady bragged about it on Russian propaganda TV.  Cooperating with the Russians to defame American military officers and enlisted men that were fighting to stop global terrorism. Were there problems with the Jawad prosecution and arrest? Perhaps, but the other prosecutors seemed to be smart enough to keep their head down and keep a low profile while doing any task they were ordered to do.  Kannady seems to have thrown his heart into his work and crossed the line from being a lawyer to a Russian collaborator.

If Kannady was ever a Marine he was certainly an Obama Marine and ought to have been prosecuted for going on Russian TV to attack America.

Below is a document from the Department of Defense outlining the case against the terrorist that Rep. Chris Kannady helped get released. The document is said to have been released through Wiki Leaks . It paints a clear picture of a terrorist, albeit one of a young age, trained and motivated to kill American soldiers and one that probably went right back to the battlefield after Kannady helped get him released.


DEPARTMENT or DEFENSE 
ff(  . in JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA   
APO AE 09360 A 'Ti
JTF 30 September 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command,
3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another
Country with Conditions
(TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer
Agreement for Guantanamo
Detainee, Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: (S)
1. (SIINF) Personal Information
JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment
Reference Name: Amir Khan
Aliases and Current/True Name: Mohamed Jawad, Mir Jan.
Sakhi Pacha, Sakheb
Place of Birth: Miram Shah, Pakistan (PK)
Date of Birth: January 1985
Citizenship: Afghanistan 1
Internment Serial Number (ISN):
2. (SIINF) Health: Detainee is in good health. He has a history of and is monitored for adjustment disorder with depression.
Detainee has no known drug allergies.
3. (SIINF) JTF GTMO Assessment:
a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement.
b. Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DOD Control on 1 October 2004.
Detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hebz-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG).
Detainee is assessed as trained by the HIG to participate in attacks against US forces  in Kabul, Afghanistan.
Detainee participated in an attack against US Special  Forces members. When captured, detainee told Afghan authorities that he had been trained to  target Americans. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.


4. (SIINF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.
a. Prior History: Detainee dropped out of school in the eighth grade and worked for his uncle as a shopkeeper in a grocery store in Miram Shah, PK. Detainee also attended a three-month English course.

b. Recruitment and Travel: In late November/early December 2002,  while attending the Qurey Mosque in Miram Shah, detainee was called over by four men. Detainee provides conflicting accounts of his initial recruitment. In one account, detainee was asked to clear mines, in another he was offered a job that would involve "killing Americans." Detainee traveled to a Hezb-e-Islami training camp in the Jawary Mountains in Zurvery, AF. (Analyst Note: Hezb-e-Islami is assessed to be I-Iezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). HIG is a Tier 1 Counterterrorism target, defined as those terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.)

C. F) Training and Activities: Detainee spent twelve to thirteen days at the camp with approximately fifteen other people. The camp had a variety of shoulder-tired weapons, one crew served weapon (possibly artillery), two side tired rockets, and small bombs. Detainee trained on the use of various grenades, including smoke and fragmentation. (Analyst Note: Detainee also claimed on one occasion he received training on the and shoulder-fired rocket launchers) Detainee traveled to Khowst,AF with colleagues from the camp, but spent the night with his family. On approximately 16 December 2002, detainee rejoined his group and traveled to Kabul, AF, via Gardez, AF, and Logar, AF.

In Kabul, detainee and Nadir stayed ina hotel while "Thirty-nine" and "Forty-two" (the individuals who recruited and traveled with him) went to speak to the "organization leader."

d. Capture Information: On 17 December 2002, Nadir gave detainee an orange, some chocolate and a powder substance to eat. After eating these items, detainee stated he felt larger than everything and everyone around him.  (Analyst Note: Detainee made several statements implying that his colleagues at various points drugged him in his timeline.)

Detainee and Nadir, each carrying two grenades, positioned themselves approximately 100 yards apart from each other near the mosque as directed by "Thirty-nine" and "Forty-two" and waited for an American target to pass by. Detainee then observed a vehicle passing him with US Special Forces soldiers en route to Adir's location. According to detainee's account,when the vehicle approached Nadir, Nadir threw a grenade into the vehicle. After the grenade exploded, Nadir fled the scene and Afghan Military Forces apprehended detainee. Detainee was transferred to US custody shortly thereafter. (Analyst Note: In one account of the capture story, detainee claimed he attempted to throw a grenade into a Turkish International Security Assistance Force vehicle, but Nadir told him the American vehicles were the specific target for the mission. This is questionable as Nadir was 100 yards away from him on a crowded street.)

e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 6 February 2003.

f. (SIINF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:
Terrorism operations in Afghanistan, Key personnel biographies,
Hostile installations in Afghanistan

5. (SIINF) Detainee Threat:
a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk,
as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (SIINF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

Detainee is assessed as a probable member of Hebz-e-Islarni Gulbuddin (HIG).
Detainee willingly participated in training,and then traveled with a group of individuals to Kabul to carry out attacks against US forces.
Detainee was captured as the culprit of an attack on US Special Forces traveling through Kabul on 17 December 2002. Detainee initially admitted to throwing the grenades at and injuring US Special Forces team. Shortly after capture, detainee signed a confession admitting he threw the grenade at US forces, and that he conducted the attack on his own. According to the Director, Police District 2, Kabul, AF, detainee admitted throwing the grenade at US forces, and stated he was proud of what he had done.

Detainee is assessed as a member of a larger group of individuals slated to carry out attacks against US forces in Kabul in the December 2002 time frame. (Analyst Note: In both the pieces below, it is assessed that detainee is the individual captured in the 17 December 2002 attack. It is assessed that both sources are members of the  Afghan government.)

I F) According to a mid-level government official, a group of eighteen people entered  Kabul from Miram Shah to carry out attacks against US and coalition forces. The group was responsible for carrying out the grenade attack on US forces on 17 December 2002, and the shooting incident at the International Security Assistance Force Compound in Kabul on I9 December 2002.

I F) According to a senior Afghan official, in early November 2002, a group of eighteen  suicide bombers were deployed  from somewhere in Pakistan with the goal of entering Kabul. Of these individuals, one was captured in Omar Sadiq Market after the grenade attack on two US service members on 17 December 2002. (Analyst Note: The source of this information stated that it was his personal opinion that Al-Qaida, with the support of Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), trained the original eighteen attackers.)

Detainee's pocket litter contained a bus ticket from Herat, AF, to Kabul and a notebook  with the word Herat with an arrow pointing to the partially completed word Kabul and  several names and phone numbers. (Analyst Note: It is unknown what the diagram represented; however, when combined with a bus ticket from Herat. (a location detainee does not discuss  visiting), the information regarding a group of eighteen individuals, and  detainee's confession, it is probable detainee was  a  willing participant in an unidentified mission targeting US forces when he began his trip to Kabul.)

In detainee's initial story, Nadir recruited detainee to kill Americans for money. Detainee initially claimed that he was not okay with killing Americans, but decided to attend training  with the HIG in order to make more money.  (Analyst Note: Detainee has not repeated this initial admission. It is probable that detainee knew he was going to be trained  for anti-US operations, and decided that it was better for his detention if he denied voluntary involvement.) Detainee attended training at a HIG training camp shortly before the attack.

c. (FOUO) Detainee'$ Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a MODERATE threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior is usually compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff

6. (SIINF) Detainee intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: .ITF GTMO determined this detainee is of LOW intelligence value. Detainee has information on the recruitment and training processes of the HIG as well as its leadership and operatives.

b. (SIINF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:
HIG
Leadership
Operatives
Training
Recruitment
Facilitators

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combat status was reassessed on 04 November 2004 and he remains an enemy combatant.

AY W. HOOD
Major General, USA
Commanding